If the universe expands exponentially without end, "ordinary observers" like ourselves may be vastly outnumbered by "Boltzmann's brains," transient observers who briefly flicker into existence as a result of quantum or thermal fluctuations. One might then wonder why we are so atypical. I show that tiny changes in physicsfor instance, extremely slow variations of fundamental constants-can drastically change this result, and argue that one should be wary of conclusions that rely on exact knowledge of the laws of physics in the very distant future.
The fact that we observe an orderly universe is in part a characteristic of the universe, but also in part a characteristic of us. It is easy to understand why we should see orderwe are descended from a long line of evolutionary ancestors who successfully navigated their local universe long enough to reproduce, while competitors who were unable to correctly perceive the patterns of their environment were unlikely to have had descendants. As Rees [1] , Dyson et al. [2] , and Page [3] [4] [5] have pointed out, though, another kind of "observer" is possible: a "Boltzmann's brain" [6] , a transient observer appearing briefly as the result of a thermal or quantum fluctuation. * The probability that a fluctuation in a given four-volume will produce anything that we would call an observer is, of course, extraordinarily small. But in an exponentially expanding, eternal universe, such "Boltzmann's brains" are inevitable, and under reasonable circumstances might vastly outnumber ordinary observers like ourselves.
There is no reason to expect that such transient observers would experience an ordered universe, much less one with the particular order we see. We might thus ask why our observations are so atypical. Whether this is a cause for worry is debatable, but at least for anthropic arguments, it seems to be a real concern: it is hard to argue that the universe should be suited to observers like us if typical observers are so completely different.
A number of solutions to this puzzle have been proposed. If the number of ordinary observers and the number of "Boltzmann's brains" are both infinite, then the relative probability depends on the choice of measure, and choices exist for which ordinary observers predominate [8, 9] . Or perhaps the universe decays very rapidly [3, 5] -or, with a "holographic" measure, not so rapidly [10] -and "Boltzmann's brains" never have time to appear. Or perhaps a globally conservation laws forbid the fluctuations that could lead to the appearance of observers [11] .
One purpose of this note is to point out another simple possibility. The probability of a given thermal or quantum fluctuation depends on the value of a number of dimensionless parameters such as the fine structure constant and the electron-proton mass ratio. If these parameters vary in time, even at a rate much slower than current experimental limits, the creation of "Boltzmann's brains" may be strongly suppressed.
Consider, for example, two of the "Boltzmann's brains" discussed by Page in [4] . A "brief brain" appears as a quantum fluctuation, with energy E, characteristic length r, and action S ∼ Er/ c. For a "brain" containing N nucleons,
where m p is the proton mass, m e is the electron mass, and a 0 is the Bohr radius. The action is thus
(For N on the order of 10 4 times Avogadro's number, this agrees with Page's estimate [4] of S bb ∼ 10 42 .) A "long brain" appears as a thermal fluctuation of de Sitter space, with an action S ∼ βE, where β is the inverse de Sitter temperature; that is,
where H Λ = c Λ/3 is the asymptotic Hubble constant. The probability of a fluctuation goes roughly as e −S , while the four-volume (at least for a given "pocket universe") grows as e 3H Λ t . The number of "Boltzmann's brains" is thus
These are, of course, very crude approximations, involving order-of-magnitude estimates in the exponents, but they give a reasonable qualitative picture. In particular, at present (H Λ t ∼ 1) the numbers are tiny, but as t increases, they grow without limit. Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the dimensionless parameters appearing in S-the fine structure constant, the electron-proton mass ratio, etc.-are independent of time. While this may be a reasonable starting point, it is by no means a certainty. In Kaluza-Klein theories, for example, such constants depend on circumferences of compact dimensions [12] , which need not be time-independent; in string theory, they depend on moduli whose dynamics can be quite complex [13] . Time-varying "constants" can appear in quintessence models [14] , in modifications of electromagnetism [15] , in variable speed of light models [16] , and in brane world scenarios [17] ; for more references, see [18] . So it is worth examining the effect of relaxing the assumption of constancy.
Let us therefore suppose that our "physical constants" can vary in time. Then the exponent in the number n bb of "brief brains" given by (4) will not grow as long aṡ
where µ 1 = m e /m p . This is about 36 orders of magnitude below present experimental limits [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , and is not likely to be tested soon. For "long brains" the computation is slightly more delicate, since one should only consider time dependence of dimensionless constants [26] . Here, the condition that the universe be asymptotically anti-de Sitter should presumably be interpreted as a statement of the constancy of H Λ in Planck units. The relevant dimensionless constant is then µ 2 = m p /M Planck , and the exponent in n lb will not grow in time as long aṡ
I do not know of an experimental test of precisely this quantity, but Big Bang nucleosynthesis places limits that depend on both m p and M Planck , so, barring unexpected cancellations, should limit variations of µ 2 . The time dependence (6) is then, optimistically, at least 67 orders of magnitude below present observational limits [18, 27] (see also [28] ). Over long enough times, of course, even slow variations of fundamental constants can lead to profound changes in physics. If 1/α grows linearly at the minimum rate allowed by (5), for instance, the electromagnetic interactions of two protons will become comparable to their gravitational interactions in about 10 90 yr . An increase in µ 2 at the minimum rate allowed by (6) will have the same effect in about 10 99 yr . It has been conjectured that gravity cannot become stronger than gauge interactions [29] ; if this is the case, new physics would have to come into play. In any case, it is unlikely in this scenario that "Boltzmann's brains" in the far future would look anything like the "observers" we now understand, and it is not clear that such objects would be possible at all.
Should we thus conclude that our existence as observers implies a time dependence of fundamental constants? Presumably not. There are many other changes in physics that could lead to the same result, from a tunneling of the Higgs to a vacuum with no electroweak symmetry breaking to a low energy breaking of color symmetry. At the same time, we have only a limited understanding of what the requirements are for an "observer": the weakless universe [30] provides one illustration of how drastically ordinary physics could change without eliminating observers.
Rather, the moral here is that we should be cautious about arguments that require precise extrapolation of our present knowledge of physics to the very distant future. We have seen that truly tiny changes in fundamental constants, many orders of magnitude below current observational limits, are enough to vitiate the "Boltzmann's brains" argument. Given the uncertainties in our knowledge of physics and the extreme sensitivity of the analysis to such uncertainties, it seems somewhat premature to draw conclusions about events 10 42 years in the future.
